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Abstract An ever-expanding body of empirical research suggests that ethno-religious
divisions adversely impact a host of normatively desirable objectives linked to the quality
of life in society, implicitly representing a strong challenge to multiculturalist theory and
policies. The appropriate conceptualization and measurement of ethno-religious divisions
has consequently become the subject of complex methodological debate. This article
unpacks some of this complexity and provides a synthetic critique of how eight key
measures each capture the notion of divisions and relate to each other conceptually, the-
oretically, and empirically within a divided society. It explores simple proportions, frac-
tionalization, polarization, cultural distance, segregation, cross-cuttingness, horizontal
inequality, and intermarriage indicators. Furthermore, instead of presenting national-level
temporal snapshots of divisions as in much work, it purposely examines how measures also
perform at more localized levels of analysis and over time, drawing on individual-level
census data from one deeply-divided society, Mindanao, in the Philippines. Analysis
underscores four major issues to which researchers should pay more attention: the sensi-
tivity of measures to (1) the underlying causal mechanisms linking divisions with out-
comes; (2) the social forces and methodologies shaping the identification and
categorization of groups; (3) the passage of time and evolution of divisions; and (4) the
level of spatial analysis. The article provides practical guidance and discusses the key
implications of these points both for quantitative scholars working with these measures and
for qualitatively-inclined empiricists and normative theorists wishing to interpret, evaluate,
or otherwise engage the quantitative research on the merits and demerits of diversity.
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1 Introduction
Nearly 2400 years ago, Aristotle in his description of the ideal polis noted an obstacle to the
realization of what he called a ‘‘choiceworthy life:’’ ‘‘ethnic difference causes faction unless
people learn to pull together’’ (Reeve 1998). Today, a large body of empirical research in
political science and economics implicitly challenges the view prominent in multiculturalist
policies and normative liberal theory (Kymlicka 1995; Young 1990) that ethno-religious
diversity should be promoted and protected in societies by evidencing its deleterious effects on
a variety of societal objectives related to the quality of life. Humandevelopment (Gerring et al.
2015), social trust (Putnam 2007; Koster 2013), the provision of public goods such as edu-
cation and health (Alesina et al. 1999; Baldwin and Huber 2010), the absence of violent
conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), democratic transition (Przeworski et al. 2000),
and indeed economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2004; Fedderke et al. 2008)
are among the outcomes an ever-expanding body of empirical work suggests ethnic diversity
adversely impacts. The appropriate measurement of ethno-religious divisions has conse-
quently become the subject of rich discussion in the scholarly literature. To capture these
divisions in their analyses, many researchers have commonly used, and continue to use, the
index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF). A number of researchers, however, have
noted serious limitations with this indicator, and the growing debate among them on how best
tomeasure such divisions underscores the significantmethodological complexity in this area.1
This paper contributes to this debate and unpacks some of its complexity by exploring
how different measures of ethno-religious divisions relate to each other conceptually,
theoretically, and empirically within the context of a divided society. Furthermore, while
much of the extant literature has focused, largely due to data constraints, on measuring
these divisions at the national level and on a single snapshot in time, we purposely make
our focus the spatial and temporal dimensions of the measures and explore here how
divisions manifest at more localized levels and how they evolve over time. We draw in this
analysis on individual-level census data for Mindanao, a deeply divided society and the
second-largest island group in the Philippines, with a population of 21.9 million (2010
Census). These data allow for greater empirical precision and deeper theoretical insight
into ethnic divisions than permitted using more aggregate statistics. The article focuses on
eight measures from the literature on ethnic politics, including those most commonly used,
plus several more that warrant consideration and are relevant to the examination of major
theories: simple proportions, fractionalization, cultural (distance) fractionalization, polar-
ization, segregation, intermarriage, horizontal inequality, and cross-cuttingness. We con-
sider both ethnic and religious cleavages for all measures, and we explore how each
1 In particular, studies have raised questions about how measures can better capture hypothesized mech-
anisms (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), reflect multiple dimensions of division (Alesina et al. 2003b;
Selway 2011), be based on politically relevant ethnic cleavages (Mozaffar et al. 2003; Posner 2004;
Wucherpfennig et al. 2011), be sensitive to changes over time (Roeder 2001), and take seriously con-
structivist concerns about the endogeneity of ethnic identities (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Green 2013;
Campos and Kuzeyev 2007).
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measure varies across multiple levels of analysis (Mindanao, region, province, munici-
pality, and barangay) and over time (2000 and 2010).
The paper has three readerships in mind. First, for those interested in divided societies,
it evidences in one case the complex, multi-faceted, and dynamic character of ethno-
religious divisions and the challenge of conveying them. Second, for scholars working on
how ethnic and religious politics influence various dimensions of the quality of life, it
serves as a synthetic and comparative guide to how divisions are conceptualized and
measured in quantitative work across their respective literatures. Third, for qualitatively-
inclined empiricists and normative theorists wishing to interpret, evaluate or otherwise
engage the quantitative research on the merits of diversity, it highlights four conceptually
‘‘big’’ issues that, we argue, deserve more attention and further investigation. These four
issues will not be altogether new to specialists of ethnic politics measurement, but when
compared with previous work, the fine-grained data here allow for more precise exami-
nation of each and for new insights into related methodological and theoretical points:
1. Sensitivity to the choice of measure Measures of divisions rely on distinct theoretical
logics, and, unsurprisingly, do not all correlate well empirically. As scholars, we
should take care to select our measures with explicit reference to theory and
specifically their fit with posited mechanisms. One underestimated concern is the
potential mismatch between the individual-level logics used in several prominent
mechanisms and the aggregation logics implicit in all the measures.
2. Sensitivity to categorization The decision of which ethno-religious categories to use in
measurement is highly consequential yet rarely obvious, even in divided societies. As
group identities are fluid and socially-constructed, it is important then to illuminate the
forces at work and to justify the categorization methodology behind group
classification. Nation-building and minority promotion policies for instance may
powerfully shape the motivations of state officials and incipient social groups
respectively.
3. Sensitivity to time Divisions evolve and so when data is collected matters; substantial
changes in some of these measures can be seen even within a relatively brief period
such as a decade. Using outdated data—as is often done—thus is problematic. We then
should pay more attention to the drivers of change—migration, modernization, and
assimilation for instance—in the societies that we study.
4. Sensitivity to space Divisions manifest differently at different levels of analysis and
researchers should accordingly beware the modifiable areal unit problem and the
ecological fallacy. We should identify the appropriate level of analysis using theory to
specify the mechanism or causal pathway through which ethnic divisions lead to
observed outcomes—not, as is often done, simply conduct analysis at the lowest level
of aggregation for which we can obtain data. We should also be more sensitive to how
spatial organization, notably settlement patterns, influences societal divisions.
The next section of this article unpacks the conceptual complexity of the notion of an
‘‘ethnic division’’ and compares the conceptualizations implicit in each of the eight
measures. The article then introduces Mindanao, the divided society for which we
explore the measures, before turning to discussion of how the eight measures capture its
divisions empirically. Finally, the article synthesizes the empirical discussion to sub-
stantiate the four points listed above before concluding with discussion of implications
for future research.
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2 A Menu of Measures
Researchers interested in the effects of ethnic diversity and division on quality of life
outcomes face a myriad of quantitative measures.2 This article focuses on eight of the key
ones: simple proportions, fractionalization, cultural (distance) fractionalization, polariza-
tion, segregation (index of dissimilarity), intermarriage (intermarriage index), horizontal
inequality (group-weighted coefficient of variation—GCOV), and cross-cuttingness. While
a variety of other measures exist, these are the ones most commonly used in the quanti-
tative literature on ethnic politics and political economy, plus several others we believe
warrant more consideration given their relevance to major theories. Mathematical formulae
are summarized in Table 1.
A handful of key conceptual aspects of ethnic divisions are captured in these measures.
Each measure in turn suggests an underlying conceptual logic and link to theories of ethnic
politics and political economy. Such links are sometimes explicit, but more often implicit.
While there is not space here to review the conceptualization and operationalization of
each measure in depth, much less all of the ways in which each might be linked to relevant
theoretical literatures, we introduce key conceptual aspects captured in these measures and
discuss some of the links to major theories. Which of these measures should researchers
then use? As discussed in the final section of this paper, the answers here should vary,
based on careful consideration of which measures best fit mechanisms underlying theo-
retical hypotheses. Further, it should be noted that some key conceptual aspects highlighted
in theory are not captured in any of these measures, suggesting the need for continued work
on measurement.
The key aspect highlighted in each of the eight measures is an accounting for social
structure, specifically the number and sizes of groups.3 The complex configurations pos-
sible on these two structural dimensions support manifold theoretical logics. For instance,
as the number of groups in society rises, coordination between groups may be more
difficult, making collective action less likely and conflict more likely (Hardin 1995).
Alternatively, as a group increases in size, it may become more threatening within society.
Thus, one theory of ethnic civil war assumes that societies comprising two equally-sized
groups will also be maximally-polarized (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). The logic of
both group number and group size also underpins theories of electoral mobilization where
political elites calculate the support needed to achieve a minimum winning coalition (Riker
1962).
The dimensionality of divisions is another key aspect captured in these measures. The
first six measures listed above are one-dimensional, capturing only one ethnic dimension at
once. The last two, horizontal inequality and cross-cuttingness, are two-dimensional,
2 Much of the literature refers interchangeably to ethnic divisions, diversity, and heterogeneity. In this
article, we favor the term ‘‘divisions’’ as we see a subtle but important conceptual distinction between it and
the latter two. Diversity and heterogeneity emphasize difference within society. Yet there are an infinite
number of differences that might be enumerated and many of them have neither current nor historical social,
political, or economic salience (Miguel 2004; Posner 2004). Divisions refer then only to ‘‘salient’’ differ-
ences, and it is for this reason we use data on politically-salient ethnic and religious categories to construct
our measures.
3 Two measures, segregation (dissimilarity) and the intermarriage index, assume a two-group structure.
Both, however, can be adapted for use with multiple groups although arguably sacrifice some interpretability
in doing so.
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providing information about two social dimensions at once (e.g., ethnicity and socioeco-
nomic class, or language and religion).4 While non-specialists often treat ethnic divi-
sions—and social divisions more broadly—as relatively straightforward and singular, the
research literature shows clearly that in fact they tend to be multi-dimensional, based both
Table 1 Diversity measures
Simple proportions pi Where pi is the proportion of individuals
who belong to group i
Fractionalization (Taylor
and Hudson 1972)
1P
n
i¼1
p2i
Where pi is the proportion of individuals
who belong to group i and n is the number
of groups
Cultural (distance)
fractionalization
Fearon 2003)
1P
n
i¼1
Pn
j¼1
pipjrij
Where pi is the proportion of individuals
who belong to group i, pj is the proportion
of individuals who belong to group j, n is
the number of groups, and rij is a measure
of cultural distance (linguistic similarity)
between groups i and ja
Polarization (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol
2005)
1P
n
i¼1
0:5 pi
0:5
 2
pi
Where pi is the proportion of group i and
n is the number of groups
Segregation (index of
dissimilarity) (Duncan
and Duncan 1955)
0:5
Pn
i¼1
mi
M
 ci
C



 Where mi and ci are the populations of each
group respectively in the smaller
geographic sub-unit, i, and M and C are
the total populations of each group in the
larger geographic unit under analysis, and
n is the number of geographic sub-units
Intermarriage index
(Schoen 1988)
Cij
Mi
þ Cji
Fi
þ Cji
Mj
þ Cij
Fj
ðCiiþCij Þ
Mi
þ Cii þCjið Þ
Fi
þ ðCjj þCji Þ
Mj
þ ðCjjþCij Þ
Fj
Where Mi is the size of the male population
(married and unmarried) of group i, Fj is
the size of the female population (married
and unmarried) of group j, and Cij is the
number of unions between males of group
i and females of group j
Horizontal inequality
(GCOV) (see Mancini
2005)
1
y
PR
r
pr yr  yð Þ2
  12 Where y is the quantity of the variable of
interest (e.g., level of education); yr ¼
1
nr
Pnr
i yir and is the mean value of y for
group r; R is the number of groups; and pr
is group r’s population share
Cross-cuttingness (Selway
2011) 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Pr
i¼1
Pc
j¼1
OijEijð Þ2
Eij


Nm
s
Where
Pr
i¼1
Pc
j¼1
OijEijð Þ2
Eij
is the Chi square test
statistic in a contingency table; r is the
number of rows (e.g., number of ethnic
groups); c is the number of columns (e.g.,
number of religious groups); Oij is the
actual number in cellij; Eij is the expected
number in cellij; N is the sample size; and
m is the smaller of either (r - 1) or
(c - 1). It is Cramer’s V subtracted
from 1.
a rij ¼ l15
a
where l is the number of shared classifications between i and j, 15 is the maximum number of
classifications in the dataset, and a is set at . Alternatively, for instance, Desmet et al. (2009) set it at 1/20
4 Duclos et al. (2004) have also presented a multi-dimensional measure of polarization.
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in multiple ascriptive characteristics such as tribe, race, language, and caste (often col-
lectively equated with a broad conceptualization of ethnicity) and in more attitudinal
characteristics such as class, ideology, and religion (Lane and Ersson 1994). In this sense,
all measures reviewed here potentially underestimate the extent of a society’s divisions.
In using these measures in analysis, the multidimensionality of societal divisions can be
addressed in part through inclusion of several one-dimensional measures calculated for
multiple dimensions individually—e.g., the ELF for both ethnicity and religion. However,
this fix does not fully address the interrelations between dimensions. Consider, for
instance, the conceptual aspects and theoretical discussions that can be assessed using the
two-dimensional measures, cross-cuttingness and horizontal inequality. Classic theories
suggest that ‘‘reinforcing’’ cleavages imply deeper division and more conflict (Lijphart
1977). Likewise, the coincidence of ethnicity and class in ‘‘ranked’’ societies—which can
be assessed using measures of horizontal inequality—features in major theories of ethnic
conflict (Horowitz 1985). By contrast, cross-cutting cleavages—where characteristics cut
across, rather than fall along, group boundaries—are seen to moderate divisions. A society
comprising two ethnic groups each in turn comprising equal proportions of Protestants and
Catholics would have a cross-cutting cleavage. The logic of cross-cutting cleavages lies at
the heart of theories of political stability in multi-party and multiethnic democracies, for
example. In such societies, political attitudes and beliefs are expected to be less intense
because individuals feel ‘‘cross-pressured’’ or pulled between conflicting forces (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967).
It is not only the existence of different groups of different sizes but also the intensity of
their differences that may matter: greater differences signify deeper divisions. Early the-
ories of genocide, for instance, emphasized deep cleavages within society (Kuper 1982).
The notion is closely related to the constructs of social distance (Bogardus 1933) and
identity salience (Brewer 1985). Yet conceptualizing a division’s intensity or the distance
between groups is challenging. The extent of difference may be more a matter of subjective
experience than objective quantification. Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda share language, cul-
ture, and religion but nonetheless feel their differences very strongly. Cultural (distance)
fractionalization, for one, speaks to this aspect of division by using data on language
families to assess the cultural distance between ethnic groups based on their predominant
language. Horizontal inequality and cross-cuttingness measures also speak to distance by
capturing observed differences in socioeconomic status and other social markers,
respectively.
Status asymmetries, such as those captured by the horizontal inequality measure, may
motivate the negative sentiments that characterize divided societies. High status groups
may feel contempt and low status groups resentment vis-a`-vis each other. This asymmetry
may be material. Economic inequality and political exclusion along ethnic lines, for
instance, have featured in explanations of ethnic civil wars (Cederman et al. 2011).
Similarly, relative deprivation, a construct operational at both the individual and group-
levels, has been linked to the broader notion of rebellion (Gurr 1970). The conceptual logic
linking theories based on material asymmetry is grievance. Yet the asymmetry may also be
symbolic. The theoretical logic emphasized in this context is threats to, or anxiety over, a
group’s self-esteem. Such perceptions are believed also capable of motivating ethnic
conflicts (Horowitz 1985).
Ethnic division may further be observed in the spatial organization of groups, as
captured by segregation measures, another conceptually important aspect of ethnic
cleavages. Settlement patterns may indicate a preference to live with co-ethnics and may
also affect interaction within and across ethnic groups. We would expect a society
O. S. McDoom, R. M. Gisselquist
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comprising two equally-sized groups living in two territorially-distinct regions to function
differently to a society where members of the same two groups live side-by-side as
neighbors. The spatial organization of groups is also relevant to institutional theories of
governance and democracy in plural societies. The design of consociational or majoritarian
institutions, for instance, may turn on the geographic distribution of ethnic groups (Lijphart
1977).
Segregation and other measures in turn may be suggestive of levels of interaction
between groups but, of the measures explored here, only intermarriage is based directly on
observed behavior. Interaction and cross-group ties are believed to diffuse information,
build trust, and facilitate cooperation across social boundaries. The logic is conceptually
embedded in social capital theory (Putnam 2000) and in theories of interethnic conflict and
cooperation (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2001) where connections that bridge ethnic
networks are seen as desirable. The broader notion of intergroup ‘‘contact,’’ developed
within social psychology, is conceptually related and is believed, under certain conditions,
to reduce prejudice between groups (Allport 1958; Hewstone and Swart 2011).
Table 2 summarizes which of the above conceptual logics underpins each measure. It is
also worth noting that some aspects of ethnic divisions highlighted in the theoretical
literature are not captured by any of these measures. For instance, with reference to the last
point, none of these measures is based on observations about the type of behavioral
interaction specifically highlighted in Putnam (2007)’s and Varshney (2001)’s work—
through formal associations of civil society. Neither does any measure capture the extent to
which state institutions such as censuses, ethnic quotas, or intermarriage laws create or
maintain ethnic boundaries (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Nor do any speak to the internal
organizational strength or cohesiveness of groups themselves, which may in turn influence
their ability to mobilize (Van Cott 2007). Relatedly, no measure distinguishes between
elite and mass-based divisions, although some theories suggest elite behavior (e.g., inter-
elite bargains) may matter more for coexistence in plural societies than mass sentiments
(Lijphart 1977). Nor, as we return to below, do these measures capture temporal issues
such as changes in diversity over time or temporal anteriority, the notion that ‘‘we were
here before you.’’ Yet these time-related issues feature prominently in theories of immi-
grant and indigenous politics for instance.
3 Case Selection
Mindanao, the southernmost of the three main island groups that make up the Philippines,
is home to approximately 22 million individuals who together comprise a society
remarkable for the multiplicity, complexity, and depth of its divisions. Mindanao then
represents a particularly hard case for any single measure that seeks to capture its divisions
and this in part motivated its selection. A single case selected for illustrative purposes
necessitates cautious generalization. Nonetheless we believe the methodological upside is
analytical depth and empirical precision and these make the trade-off with generalizability
less unattractive.
Historically, Mindanao has followed a different trajectory to the rest of the Philippines
in large part due to its early encounter with Islam in the fifteenth century (Majul 1973).
Centralized Islamic rule quickly took root in the region, most prominently in the form of
the sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan. In contrast, the two more northern
Philippine island groups of Luzon and Visayas had stronger contact with Christianity
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through Spanish colonial conquest starting in the late sixteenth century. The Moro, the
collective identity of Mindanao’s Muslim ethnic groups, fought a long series of wars,
spanning more than 300 years, against Spanish annexation. When Spain finally lost the
Philippines to the United States in 1898, Mindanao’s new colonizer came to govern the
territory through accommodations reached with certain local Muslim elites (Abinales
2010). Moro resistance re-emerged, however, following independence in 1946, this time
against incorporation into the modern Filipino nation-state. Mindanao is also home to the
Lumad, the collective identity of the island’s mostly un-Islamicized and un-Christianized
indigenous groups. As a smaller, less organized minority, their situation, although similar
in several ways to that of the Moro, has garnered much less attention.
The mass migration of Filipino Christian settlers from the Luzon and Visayas island
groups, instituted under American rule and expanded by the post-independence Philippines
government, dramatically restructured Mindanao’s demography and lies at the heart of its
native-settler conflict. Mindanao’s Muslim population, which today numbers nearly
5 million, declined from 76 to 22 % between 1903 and 2010 and the Lumad, who comprise
over 3 million individuals today, experienced a similar minoritization. Mandatory land
registration, also introduced during the American administration, compounded the Moro
and Lumad sense of dispossession as it allowed the ownership of many ancestral lands to
pass into foreign, often settler, hands. Today, the provinces in which Mindanao’s Muslims
are concentrated have some of the worst poverty, education, and health indicators in all of
the Philippines (McKenna 1998). Moro, and Lumad, attribute their marginalization to
indifference if not discrimination from the Philippines central government. In part, how-
ever, the subordinate position of ordinary Moro can be traced to local leadership. Local
Muslim lords (datus), even today, wield considerable influence over many ordinary Moro
through strong clientelist bonds and engage in bitter and sometimes violent inter-clan
rivalries (rido) that represent in their own right another important societal divide (Torres
2014).
The indigenous population’s sense of historical injustice and contemporary disadvan-
tage has fuelled communal violence and motivated several armed Moro separatist move-
ments since independence. Mindanao’s civil war, at its peak between 1972 and 1976, saw
the rise of both the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the idea of an independent
Bangsamoro (Moro Land) (McKenna 1998). The war killed, by one estimate, 50–100,000
individuals and displaced a million more (Ahmad 2000). It remains not fully resolved
today in part due to differences between the separatist movements. An initial agreement
with the MNLF that would eventually create the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) in 1991 was shunned by its main breakaway rival, the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF). A subsequent agreement with the MILF, in 2014, to replace ARMM with
the ‘‘Bangsamoro Political Entity,’’ in turn alienated elements within the MNLF. While
lasting peace remains uncertain, violence and displacement have continued and deepened
Mindanao’s divisions.
4 The Data
We draw on data from the 2000 and 2010 censuses for the Philippines. Unusually for a
national census, the Philippines National Statistics Office released individual-level records
for all households in Mindanao providing us with an extraordinarily rich source of
information: our dataset contains detailed information on 21.9 million individuals in 2010
The Measurement of Ethnic and Religious Divisions: Spatial…
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and 18.1 million individuals in 2000. As there had been administrative boundary changes
in the 10-year interval, we realigned the 2010 data to make them comparable with the 2000
data.5 The Philippines’ territorial organization comprises four administrative levels and in
2000 Mindanao was composed of 6 regions, 25 provinces, 430 municipalities, and 10,019
barangays. We constructed the various measures of divisions for all administrative levels
and for both census years.
Following recent literature, we focus our analysis on politically salient ethno-religious
categories to capture societal divisions (Posner 2004; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Wucherpfennig
et al. 2011). As the case analysis above suggests, two dimensions of ethno-religious
cleavage have been particularly salient in Mindanao politics.6 The first, which we label
‘‘ethnic’’ for simplicity, includes three categories: Moro, Lumad, and Settler. The second
dimension, religion, includes three salient religious affiliations: Christian, Muslim, and
Other. We detail the process of how we recoded the census categories to capture these two
dimensions in the section below related to categorization sensitivity.
4.1 The Measures Applied: Mindanao in Comparative Perspective
Applied to Mindanao, the eight measures we examine collectively illustrate the complex,
dynamic, and multi-faceted nature of ethnic divisions in a divided society. Below we
discuss what is learned from each of these measures in turn, comparing Mindanao’s scores
against those in other countries and regions when available. Overall, the measures broadly
confirm that Mindanao is, comparatively, a deeply-divided society. It is highly fraction-
alized and polarized, strongly spatially and socially segregated, and has ethnically and
religiously reinforcing cleavages. However, as we will see, deeper analysis suggests a more
complex portrait: measures describe generally higher levels of religious and ethnic division
at higher administrative levels than at lower levels; furthermore, depending on the measure
chosen, they suggest either increasing or decreasing divisions between 2000 and 2010.
Table 3 provides illustrative mean values for all eight measures in 2000 and 2010 across
the five administrative levels.7
5 We note boundary change in itself may be indicative of societal divisions.
6 The discussion above also highlights the salience of clan divisions, which are not captured in the census.
7 It is worth noting that for four of the eight measures explored here—intermarriage, segregation, cross-
cuttingness, and horizontal inequality—researchers face an important choice in how to report these values if
their objective is to compare subnational rather than national units. In Mindanao, three religious groups
(Muslim, Christian, Other) and three ethnic groups (Moro, Settler, Lumad) exist at the national level.
However, not all three groups are present at all subnational levels. Some subnational units are perfectly
homogeneous or else only two of the three religious or ethnic groups are present. Consequently, for
subnational units where one or more of the national-level groups is wholly absent, researchers face a choice
between calculating the measures using all the national-level groups (option A) or else using only the groups
that exist in a particular subnational unit (option B). In perfectly homogeneous units, researchers strictly face
no choice as the intermarriage, segregation, and cross-cuttingness scores cannot be calculated given the
mathematical impossibility of dividing by zero. However, for horizontal inequality (which generates a value
of zero for perfectly homogeneous units) and for the other three measures where at least two of the national-
level groups exist, we believe option B can, in certain cases, lead to theoretically misleading outcomes when
comparing subnational units. For instance, in calculating horizontal inequality in Mindanao, option B would
imply that a community where only lowly-educated Muslims lived has the same value as a community
where equal numbers of Muslims and Christians lived who had equal levels of high education. Conse-
quently, we prefer to report option A, even though this has the undesirable practical effect of reducing the
sample size.
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Table 3 Indicators of ethnic and religious divisions compared across time and space (mean values)
Indicator Mindanao
(n = 1)
Region
(n = 6)
Province
(n = 25)
Municipality
(n B 430)a
Barangay
(n B 10,019)b
Simple proportions
Ethnicity (Moro)
2000 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.30
2010 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.31
Religion (Muslim)
2000 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.30
2010 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.31
Fractionalization (0 = minimum; 1 = maximal)
Ethnicity
2000 0.46 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.12
2010 0.53 0.37 0.34 0.24 0.16
Religion
2000 0.37 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.08
2010 0.38 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.08
Cultural (distance) fractionalization (0 = minimum; 1 = maximal)
Ethnicity
2000 0.44 0.29 0.27 0.19 0.12
2010 0.49 0.36 0.33 0.23 0.15
Religion
2000 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04
2010 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04
Polarization (0 = minimum; 1 = maximal)
Ethnicity
2000 0.75 0.55 0.51 0.37 0.23
2010 0.81 0.67 0.62 0.44 0.30
Religion
2000 0.68 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.15
2010 0.71 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.16
Segregation (index of dissimilarity) (0 = minimum; 1 = maximal)
Ethnicity (Moro:non-Moro)
2000 0.88 0.76 0.72 0.64 n/a
2010 0.86 0.70 0.66 0.58 n/a
Religion (Muslim:non-Muslim)
2000 0.88 0.76 0.73 0.65 n/a
2010 0.87 0.73 0.70 0.61 n/a
Intermarriage index (0 = always inmarry; 0.5 = indifferent; 1 = always outmarry)
Ethnicity (Moro:Settler)
2000 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.14
2010 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.19
Religion (Muslim:Christian)
2000 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.12
2010 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.15
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4.2 Simple Proportions
The size of each ethnic or religious group relative to the total population is an intuitively-
understood and readily-calculated metric. In terms of ethnicity, the 2010 census shows the
Mindanao population to be 63.44 % Settler, 22.28 % Moro, and 14.28 % Lumad, while in
terms of religion, it is 75.39 % Christian, 22.05 % Muslim, and 2.55 % Other.8 Such
figures are broadly comparable to those reported in several divided societies, such as
Bolivia (64 % indigenous, 25 % mestizo, 10 % white) and Israel (79 % Jews, 18 %
Palestinian, 3 % Druze or unclassified), but divisions also exist in societies with different
demographic compositions (Alesina et al. 2003a).
8 Figures are calculated excluding observations for which religious and ethnic affiliation were not given by
the respondent. Note the non-response rate was extremely small: only 2162 non-responses for religion and
5040 non-responses for ethnicity out of 21,903,385 individuals in the 2010 census data for instance i.e. less
than 0.01 and 0.03 % non-response respectively.
Table 3 continued
Indicator Mindanao
(n = 1)
Region
(n = 6)
Province
(n = 25)
Municipality
(n B 430)a
Barangay
(n B 10,019)b
Horizontal inequality (GCOV and education) (0 = minimum; 1 = maximal)
Ethnicity
2000 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09
2010 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08
Religion
2000 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06
2010 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Cross-cuttingness (0 = perfectly reinforcing; 1 = perfectly cross-cutting)
Ethnicity and religion
2000 0.31 0.38 0.42 0.58 0.54
2010 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.52 0.50
We calculate the measures for each subnational unit using the same three religious (Muslim, Christian,
Other) and same three ethnic groups (Moro, Settler, Lumad) that exist at the national level. Consequently,
for the intermarriage, segregation, horizontal inequality, and cross-cuttingness measures, we exclude those
subnational units where any one of these groups was entirely absent (i.e. had zero members). To include
such subnational units would generate values with potentially misleading implications for our analysis
a At the municipal level, n is lower for four measures due to missing data arising primarily from the
decision described above: for the intermarriage index, n = 419 in 2000 and n = 423 in 2010 for religion;
for horizontal inequality, n = 402 for ethnicity and 403 for religion in 2000 and n = 428 and 372,
respectively, in 2010; for cross-cuttingness, n = 405 for 2000 and 2010; and for segregation, n = 427 and
417 in 2000 for ethnicity and religion respectively and n = 428 and 429 in 2010 for ethnicity and religion
respectively
b At the barangay level, n is lower for various measures due to missing data arising in part from the decision
described above: for simple proportions, n = 10,015 for ethnicity and 10,019 for religion; for fractional-
ization, cultural (distance) fractionalization, and polarization, n = 10,015 for ethnicity in 2000 and
n = 10,019 for all others; for the intermarriage index, n = 4215 and 5245 for religion in 2000 and 2010, and
n = 4810 and 5276 for ethnicity; for horizontal inequality, n = 3263 for ethnicity and 2623 for religion in
2000, and n = 5128 and 3402, respectively, in 2010; for cross-cuttingness, n = 2145 in 2000, and n = 3224
in 2010
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A major challenge in employing simple proportions is that there is little consensus on
their precise interpretation. For instance, based on the region’s political history, we might
predict the size of the Muslim/Moro population to be especially salient to political out-
comes in Mindanao. As Table 3 shows, Muslims and Moros each represented about one-
fifth of the population in 2000 and 2010, with mean values increasing monotonically to an
average of roughly 30 % at lower administrative levels. One interpretation then might be
that Muslim/Moro political influence should be higher at lower administrative levels. An
alternative perspective based on the notion of a minimum winning coalition would
emphasize instead the size of the larger populations: both Settler and Christian groups each
constitute winning coalitions of larger than 50 % each on average at all administrative
levels. Strategically then, political entrepreneurs might achieve majority support by
focusing on either of these constituencies and ignoring Muslim and Moro constituencies
(see Riker 1962).
4.3 Fractionalization
The index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) has prevailed as the most commonly-
used measure of ethnic divisions in quantitative work. Intuitively, it describes the proba-
bility that two individuals selected at random will be from different ethnic groups and
ranges from complete homogeneity (0) to complete heterogeneity (1). The measure is an
adaptation of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration
(Herfindahl 1950; Hirschman 1945).9 Its primacy is partly attributable to its early adoption
in the literature. Taylor and Hudson (1972)’s calculation of the ELF, based primarily on
data compiled in 1960 in the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), was used in several early
studies exploring heterogeneity and growth, including Mauro (1995) and Easterly and
Levine (1997). Later work updated these data (Roeder 2001) and calculated the ELF using
other cross-national sources (Alesina et al. 2003b). In Alesina et al. (1999), fractional-
ization measures calculated using national data have also been used as a proxy for the
polarization of preferences.
Cross-national data on ethnic fractionalization shows a world average of 0.44 (Alesina
et al. 2003a). As Table 3 shows, ethnic fractionalization values in Mindanao have been
slightly higher that this global average, but decline as we move towards the barangay level,
suggesting that smaller communities are more ethnically homogeneous. Fractionalization
values are also higher for ethnicity than religion, and higher in 2010 as compared to 2000,
suggesting divisions increasing over time.
4.4 Cultural (Distance) Fractionalization
Many standard diversity measures treat all differences between ethnic groups as equiva-
lent, but some differences may be more meaningful that others. In particular, the depth of
linguistic and cultural differences between groups may play a role, for instance, in hin-
dering inter-group interaction or may proxy for greater differences in inter-group prefer-
ences. The most commonly used measure that takes cultural distance into account is
cultural fractionalization, which is fractionalization weighted by cultural distance
(Greenberg 1956; Fearon 2003). Cultural distance is assessed based on language and
9 The key differences are that the ELF is calculated as (1-HHI) and that the HHI uses the 50 largest firms
while ELF generally is calculated using all ethnic groups identified.
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derived from the number of shared language tree branches between the dominant or
common language of each ethnic group.10
Consistent with Fearon’s analysis at the cross-national level, Mindanao’s cultural
fractionalization values (Table 3) tend to be slightly lower than standard fractionalization
values, and, as with Mindanao’s fractionalization values, generally lower at lower
administrative levels, suggestive of the geographic segregation of ethno-religious groups.
Religious groups in Mindanao are not well distinguished by language differences, so
cultural fractionalization along religious lines is lower than that for ethnicity.
4.5 Polarization
Ethnic polarization is a demographic measure that assumes a society is most deeply-
divided when it comprises two groups each representing half of the population (Reynal-
Querol 2002). The measure’s underlying logic, adapted from Esteban and Ray (1994),
assumes group members share characteristics that differ from other groups’ characteristics
and that societal conflict is most likely when these characteristics are distributed bimodally
in a population.
Polarization scores for Mindanao (Table 3) reveal an empirical pattern similar to
fractionalization: As the administrative level declines, polarization declines. At the Min-
danao-level, society appears highly polarized ethnically with a score of 0.75 in 2000,
comparable to Sri Lanka. At the barangay-level, ethnic polarization is much lower with a
mean of 0.23, comparable to Austria.
4.6 Segregation
Conceptually, segregation can be thought of as the ‘‘extent to which individuals from
different groups occupy and experience different social environments’’ (Reardon and
O’Sullivan 2004). The construct has served in scholarly analysis both as explanandum and
explanans where it has been associated with poor outcomes in poverty, health, education,
and crime in the U.S. urban context. Segregation may also be the result of ethnic violence
or of explicit policies of discrimination.
We present perhaps the most widely-used measure of segregation, the index of dis-
similarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955). Technically, dissimilarity measures ‘‘the proportion
of minority members that would have to change their area of residence to achieve an even
distribution’’ within the region under analysis (Massey and Denton 1988).11 The dissim-
ilarity index then emphasizes ‘‘evenness’’ in settlement patterns.12 In Mindanao, the index
of dissimilarity between Muslims and non-Muslims (and between Moro and non-Moro) is
high at all administrative levels (see Table 3). Segregation is adjudged severe in the U.S.
context when the index attains 0.80 and higher. In Mindanao as a whole the score for
10 In classifying language groups, Fearon (2003) and Desmet et al. (2009) rely on the Ethnologue: Lan-
guages of the World (see Lewis et al. 2014).
11 We report segregation scores assuming only two groups in society e.g. Muslims vs non-Muslims;
Christians vs non-Christians. Although multi-group segregation measures exist (Reardon and Firebaugh
2002), their interpretation is not straightforward. We believe a better approach is to report a separate
segregation score for each group of interest.
12 Evenness is only one of five conceptually distinct dimensions of segregation that sociologists originally
distinguished to capture distinct patterns of settlement: the others are centralization, clustering, exposure,
and concentration of groups. Segregation measures exist to capture each of these dimensions and scholars
exploring theories that highlight the spatial organization of groups would do well to consider these as well.
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Muslim/non-Muslim segregation is 0.88 in 2000. As with other measures, these values
decline as the administrative level declines, but their decrease is less dramatic in relative
terms than for the other measures.13 The fact that divisions also appear less severe using
other measures at lower levels of government is suggestive of the spatial segregation of
ethno-religious groups at higher levels of analysis.
4.7 Intermarriage
Intermarriage is shaped by both individual preferences and structural opportunities to
outmarry (Kalmijn 1998). Preferences may reflect an individual’s desire for particular
socio-cultural resources in a partner as well as group norms and sanctions regarding
exogamy. Insofar as preferences matter then, intermarriage is likely a good indicator of
societal divisions as it is a direct measure of behavioural interaction across group
boundaries. Opportunity factors, however, notably the relative sizes and the spatial orga-
nization of groups, also affect intermarriage rates. Individuals from small minority groups
may have to outmarry and individuals from groups that are geographically isolated may
have to inmarry. The intermarriage index, first developed by Schoen (1988), addresses the
confounding issue created by relative group size. The index is scaled from 0 to 1 where 0
indicates perfect endogamy and 1 perfect exogamy. A value of 0.5 indicates random
selection of marital partner. Despite its relevance to the study of ethnicity, quantitative
work in political science and political economy has rarely used measures of intermarriage,
while it is more commonly used in sociology. A key practical constraint is the need for
individual-level or household-level data to calculate intermarriage rates.
In Mindanao, intermarriage is rare, but interestingly, increased between 2000 and 2010.
Assuming that higher intermarriage reflects better intergroup relations, this suggests
Mindanao may be becoming less divided, which on the surface appears different to the
story told by fractionalization and polarization measures. Intermarriage rates are also
higher at lower administrative levels. This appears broadly consistent with what we see in
other measures: communities appear less divided at lower levels of analysis.
Finally, it is worth noting the reduced sample size at the municipal and barangay levels.
This is due to the perfect homogeneity of these communities: they contain zero members of
certain ethnic and religious groups that are salient at the Mindanao level. As a conse-
quence, the measure cannot be calculated as it would involve the impossibility of dividing
by zero, suggesting a potential limitation to the use of the measure at subnational levels in
spatially segregated societies.
4.8 Horizontal Inequality
Another characteristic of ethnic division is the degree of economic, political, and social
inequality between members of different ethnic groups—i.e., horizontal inequality (Ste-
wart 2008). Cross-national analyses suggest that horizontal inequalities between ethnic
groups—more than ethnic difference, cultural distance, or income inequality alone—may
drive observed relationships between ethnic divisions and both ethnic civil war (Cederman
et al. 2011) and low public goods provision (Baldwin and Huber 2010).
Horizontal inequality has been addressed in the literature in multiple ways, but no
consensus has emerged in quantitative analyses on a single preferred measure. Here we
13 Segregation measures are calculated using data from the next lowest level of government, thus they
cannot be calculated below the municipality level here.
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focus on the coefficient of variation by groups (GCOV), a common measure of regional
disparities and among the three measures favored by Stewart (2008).14 We focus on
socioeconomic inequality, which in the absence of income or employment data in the
census is assessed using available data on educational attainment. The data are grouped to
create a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates no education and 10 indicates education beyond
the baccalaureate degree.
As shown in Table 3, GCOV at the Mindanao level is between 0.14 and 0.15 for ethnic
groups and about 0.09 for religious groups.15 It further declines for both types of groups at
lower administrative levels. Like the intermarriage index, we focus here only on hetero-
geneous communities in which all ethnic and religious groups salient at the national level
are present; thus, the sample size is reduced at lower administrative levels, notably
municipalities and barangays.16
The figures here appear broadly comparable to those reported by Mancini (2005) in
similar analysis across Indonesian districts using years of education (with average GCOV
of 0.10). It is worth noting that a key challenge in considering horizontal inequality
remains the relative lack of comparable, cross-national data. This stems both from
weaknesses in the data available across countries and from the use of different measures of
horizontal inequality and different proxies for economic (and social and political)
inequality in the extant literature.
4.9 Cross-Cuttingness
As discussed above, the degree to which various social cleavages overlap and intersect has
long been highlighted in the literature as a key factor in understanding democratic stability
and breakdown. Cross-cuttingness measures may be calculated to estimate the intersection
between any two distinct dimensions of social divisions such as ethnicity, language,
religion, and, as recently suggested, culture (Desmet et al. 2015). To the extent that cross-
cuttingnessness measures may also capture the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic
cleavages, including socio-economic class, horizontal inequality can be seen as one type of
cross-cuttingness measure.
Despite the importance of cross-cuttingness to the literature, quantitative analyses have
rarely used cross-cuttingness measures. Although measures were developed early on (Rae
and Taylor 1970), until Selway (2011) cross-national data on crosscuttingness were lim-
ited.17 Here we use Selway’s formulation, which is a measure of statistical independence.
In the context of ethnicity and religion, it tells us how much an individual’s religion will
also tell us about her ethnicity.
14 The most systematic analysis of horizontal inequality measurement has been conducted by Frances
Stewart’s research program. In particular, Stewart et al. (2010) develops principles for evaluation of
measures and recommends three best measures: GCOV, the group-weighted GINI (GGini), and the group-
weighted Theil (GTheil). In our view, GCOV benefits from more straightforward interpretation (especially
when compared to GTheil). For measures calculated at the group-level, see also Cederman et al. (2011).
15 Figures reported in Table 3 are based on the adult population only. As horizontal inequality is calculated
here with respect to educational attainment including children may bias results if the age distribution of
different ethnic groups differs.
16 See Footnote 7 for details.
17 Selway (2011) proposes three measures of cross-cuttingness: ‘‘subgroup fractionalization,’’ ‘‘crosscut-
tingness,’’ and ‘‘cross-fractionalization’’ (which is based on Rae and Taylor’s measure of cross-cuttingness).
We use only the cross-cuttingness measure here, which in our view has the simplest interpretation.
O. S. McDoom, R. M. Gisselquist
123
Compared to other countries, the data for Mindanao suggest a low degree of cross-
cuttingness overall. Selway (2011)’s data, for instance, indicate that the world region with
the lowest crosscuttingness values, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Bloc, has a
country average of 0.61, which is higher than all of the values shown in Table 3. In
Mindanao, the data suggest that ethnicity and religion are more cross-cutting the lower the
administrative level, and slightly less cross-cutting in 2000 than 2010.18 In other words,
cleavages appear to be more reinforcing at the Mindanao level than at the municipal or
barangay level. If Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are correct, then, data for Mindanao on cross-
cuttingness points to ethnic division being worse on average the larger the administrative
unit.
5 Comparative Findings and Guidance for Researchers
We highlight four conceptually major points that emerge from the preceding analysis to
which we believe researchers should pay more attention and that deserve further investi-
gation. These points will not be altogether new for specialists of ethnic politics (although
frequently ignored in quantitative analysis), but the empirical precision with which they
can be made here allows for deeper theoretical understanding and, importantly, compar-
isons between measures.
5.1 Sensitivity to Chosen Measure
The eight measures highlighted here capture conceptually distinct aspects of societal
divisions. Thus, while they point to similar trends and patterns, it should not be surprising
that they do not necessarily correlate well empirically. Table 4 illustrates with the corre-
lation matrix for ethnic measures in 2000 at the municipal level. As the data show,
polarization, fractionalization, and cultural (distance) fractionalization are well-correlated.
Yet, the weak correlations for most measures support the commonsensical (though not
consistently-practiced) view that measures should be chosen with reference to theory and
specifically their fit with posited causal mechanisms (Posner 2004). Understanding the
conceptual logic underpinning a measure then is crucial as measures are not all
interchangeable.
A secondary implication of measure distinctiveness is that more than one measure may
be required to convey the multi-faceted character of divisions. If, for example, theory
suggests both spatial and social distance between groups matter, then both segregation and
cultural (distance) fractionalization should be considered. We should not assume any one
measure will capture the full complexity of ethnic divisions.
In order to select an appropriate measure, researchers will need to specify the mecha-
nism, that is the causal pathway through which ethnic divisions lead to particular out-
comes. A key challenge often overlooked, however, relates to potential micro–macro
disjunctions between measures and mechanisms. In the quantitative political economy
literature, for instance, three prominent mechanisms rely on individual-level logics: (1) a
preferences logic: coethnics share tastes, for instance, for particular policies or public
goods or ‘‘favor’’ coethnics and ‘‘disfavor’’ non-coethnics due to prejudice or
18 As above, this is based on values for communities in which all three ethnic and all three religious groups
salient at the national level are present. Hence, the sample size at the municipal and barangay levels is
reduced.
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discrimination (Chandra 2001); or (2) a social connections logic: coethnics have stronger
intragroup than intergroup ties and these facilitate ingroup reciprocity and accountability;
or (3) a technology logic: coethnics share cultural characteristics such as language, tra-
ditions, and values and this promotes efficient cooperation (Habyarimana et al. 2007).
Yet, in marked contrast with the methodologically individualist logics behind these
mechanisms, it is an easily-overlooked but important fact that all of these measures are
constructed at the aggregate level. Thus, they do not directly capture individual-level
preferences, connections, or characteristics, making it difficult to test these micro-logics
with these measures. Further, we know that the link between micro-motives and macro-
outcomes is not obvious (Schelling 1978) and that different aggregation techniques can
produce radically different outcomes (Arrow 1950). Yet, the literature on these measures
too rarely specifies the process linking the micro and macro levels or the theoretical
justification behind the different aggregation techniques implicit in each measure.
Researchers should consider then whether these individual-level logics and aggregation
assumptions are appropriate for their theories. Indeed, there is no reason why measures of
ethnic divisions need be based on an individual-level logic. One alternative approach, for
instance, is proposed by Cederman et al. in theorizing ethnic civil war as the result of
group-level logic: the larger an ethnic group is that is excluded from state power, the
stronger its motivation to organize and rebel (Cederman and Girardin 2007). They con-
struct a new measure, not reliant on aggregating individual characteristics, to match the
group-level logic of their mechanism.
5.2 Sensitivity to Categorization
The question of which ethnic categories should be used to construct measures of ethnic
diversity has been the topic of considerable scholarly debate (Posner 2004; Fearon 2003;
Alesina et al. 2003b; Chandra 2009). The case of Mindanao illustrates that the answer is
often open to debate and may be multi-dimensional, even in severely divided societies.
Choosing one set of categories over another in analysis thus requires both illumination and
justification.
A common choice facing researchers is between using ‘‘census enumerated’’ and
‘‘politically salient’’ categories.19 The decision is consequential: in Mindanao, for instance,
fractionalization values for 2010 are significantly higher using census-enumerated cate-
gories than politically salient ones: 0.89 (ethnic) and 0.58 (religious) compared with 0.53
and 0.38.
Here we have focused on politically salient ethnic and religious categories, i.e., ‘‘the
groups that are actually doing the competing over policy, not the ones that an ethnographer
[or census enumerator] happens to identify as representing distinct cultural units’’ (Posner
2004). Alternatively, one might argue that the ethno-religious identities and affiliations
listed in the census better capture relevant categories, for instance, because they better
reflect the categories locally-identified as relevant for official recording and thus salient to
state-society relations. Or, that they are better because categories classified as ‘‘politically
salient’’ might in fact be endogenous to the very outcomes one is trying to analyze.
But using census-enumerated categories is in fact less straightforward than it might
seem as how precisely to interpret them is problematic. Take Mindanao. The 2000 and
19 Desmet et al. (2012) suggest another approach to categorization. They calculate linguistic diversity at
different levels of aggregation and then test their predictive power against a range of political economy
outcomes, arguing this method allows the data to identify the most salient cleavages.
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2010 Philippine censuses include two relevant questions. One asks respondents to identify
their religious affiliation and a second asks for ‘‘ethnicity by blood.’’ In 2000, 83 religious
affiliations and 145 ethnic affiliations are classified, while 2010 enumerates 98 and 182
respectively.20 Variation in the categories listed from year to year then presents one
challenge, particularly for ‘‘ethnicity by blood.’’ Only 106 ethnic categories are shared
across the two censuses. Moreover, while the 2010 list is longer, it is not a more developed
version of the 2000 list as 39 categories included in 2000 are not included in 2010. A
second challenge is that the ethnic categories included are not all mutually exclusive. The
two largest groups, Bisaya/Binisaya (22.93 %) and Cebuano (18.15 %), for instance, are
sometimes treated as synonymous, while other census enumerated categories are consid-
ered by anthropologists to be subgroups of other enumerated groups (e.g., Tagabawa and
Bagobo, respectively) (Masinaring 2011). Finally, not all enumerated ethnic categories are
of the same type: Bisaya/Binisaya and Cebuano both generally refer to a Visayan language
and a regional identity, while many other groups enumerated are indigenous peoples (e.g.,
Magbekin/Magbukon/Magbukun) and others are distinguished primarily by region (e.g.,
Capizen˜o).
In short, given the categories enumerated in the census, the same respondent could have
‘‘correctly’’ selected multiple categories; the choice of category from among ‘‘correct’’
alternatives then does not reveal an obvious and objectively verifiable ethnic group ‘‘by
blood.’’ Rather, the sort of diversity shown in the Philippine census reinforces the ethnic
politics constructivists’ point that ethnic identifications are ‘‘contingent, fuzzy, and situ-
ational’’ (Fearon 2003). The ethnic information reported in the census should not then be
understood and used by researchers as objective evidence of the ethnic structure of society,
but rather as one snapshot of an ever-evolving, complex, and socially-constructed system
(see Nobles 2000).
Yet even if we accept that politically salient categories are superior to census-enu-
merated ones, one might still disagree with the politically salient categories as classified
here. To heed our own recommendation to illuminate the categorization methodology,
Table 5 lists those census-enumerated groups (in 2010) that we reclassified as either Moro
or Lumad, i.e., the politically salient categories in Mindanao. All groups not classified as
Moro or Lumad were deemed Settler groups. Notwithstanding this transparency, some of
our choices are still debatable. For instance, with respect to the ethnic dimension, the Moro
category could be understood as nested within the Lumad category as the latter refers to
groups indigenous to Mindanao, while the former refers to groups indigenous to Mindanao
that are Muslim. Here we treat the two as distinct given their distinct political salience.
Indigeneity also is not an obvious or objectively clear status: recognition as an indigenous
group is socially constructed and can be highly politicized, for instance providing access to
land and political representation (Forte 2013; Flesken 2013; Gisselquist 2005). Here we
aim to mirror as closely as possible the commonly understood indigenous status of each
group—which is distinct from whether a group is ‘‘native’’ to Mindanao. For instance,
Cotabaten˜o Chavacano refers to a dialect of Chavacano, a Spanish-based creole language,
with Cebuano, Hiligaynon, and Moro influences, originating in Cotabato City (Lewis et al.
2014). But while ‘‘native’’ to Cotabato City and with indigenous language influences, it is
20 We count ‘‘none’’ here as a religious affiliation.
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classified with the Settler category in our schema because it is not identified by our sources
as ‘‘indigenous.’’21
In sum, as these choices with respect to categorization are complex, consequential, and
far from self-evident, researchers should not bury them in their analyses, but should instead
cast light on and provide rationales for them.
5.3 Sensitivity to Time
As we show above, substantial changes can be seen in some of the standard measures of
ethno-religious divisions even within a relatively brief period such as a decade. Moreover,
the temporal sensitivity observed here reinforces our first point on how consequential the
choice of measure is: three measures (intermarriage, segregation, and horizontal inequal-
ity) imply divisions are improving, whereas four suggest they are worsening (fractional-
ization, polarization, cultural distance, and cross-cuttingness). In order to explore the
extent of such changes, we analyzed the overall percentage change between 2000 and 2010
for each of our measures (x) at each level of analysis. Given that some values are zeros, we
use the following formula:
Table 5 Moro and Lumad categories in the 2010 census
Moro Lumada
Badjao, Bajao/Bajau, Iranon/Iranun/Iraynon, Jama
Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan/Kolibugan,
Maguindanao, Maranao, Molbog, Palawani, Sama
Badajo, Sama Bangingi, Sama Laut, Sama/Samal,
Sangil, Tausug, Yakan
Aromanen-Manobo, Ata, Ata/Negrito, Ata-Manobo,
Bı´laan/Blaan, Bagobo, Bagobo-Tagabawa,
Banwaon, Bukidnon, Clata/Klata, Diangan,
Dibabawon, Dibabeen Mulitaan, Dibaben,
Direrayaan, Guiangan, Higaonon, Ilianen,
Isoroken, Kailawan/Kaylawan, Kamiguin,
Kirentenken, Lahitanen, Lambangian, Langilan,
Livunganen, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Mangguangan,
Manobo, Manobo-Blit, Manobo-Dulangan,
Mansaka, Manubo-Ubo/Manobo-Ubo, Matigsalog/
Matigsalug, Obu-Manuvu/Ubo-Manobo,
Pulangien/Pulangiyen, Subanen/Subanon/
Subanun, Tı´boli/Tboli, Tagabawa, Tagakaulo,
Talaandig, Talaingod, Teduray/Tiruray,
Tigwahanon, Tinananen
a We also conducted analysis using a looser definition of this category as ‘‘Lumad and other non-Muslim
locals,’’ i.e., to include also non-Moro groups native to the region but not classified as indigenous peoples
(e.g., Cotabaten˜o, Cotabaten˜o-Chavacano, Davao-Chavacano, Davawen˜o, Surigaonon, and Zambagen˜o-
Chavacano)
21 More specifically, we adopted the following procedure: First, we recorded information available on all
categories using eleven common sources. For categories with at least 0.009 % or more of the Mindanao
population in either census, we then classified the category as Lumad, Moro, or Settler if two of these
common sources provided consistent information. Additional sources were sought if information was
inconsistent. For categories with less than 0.009 % of the Mindanao population, only one source was
required. Second, targeted searches of online resources were then conducted for categories with insufficient
information for classification until at least two sources were found. As possible, only information from
official government sources, scholarly publications, established organizations, and newspaper articles was
recorded; information from blogs or other websites was recorded only when no other information was found.
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Temporal sensitivity ¼
Pn
i¼1 x2000i  x2010ij jPn
i¼1 x2000i
where n represents the number of barangays, municipalities, provinces, or regions
depending on the level of analysis.
The data show clearly that all measures are sensitive to time, but some more than others.
For purposes of illustration, Table 6 shows the values at the Mindanao level. Similarly
large—and larger—changes can be seen at other levels of analysis. As Table 6 suggests,
the intermarriage index is most sensitive to time: in just a decade, the Moro–Settler
intermarriage rate increased by almost 70 %. At the other end of the spectrum, the change
in horizontal inequality of religious groups (GCOV) was only about 5 %. At the Mindanao
level, the average change across the measures shown here is just over 13 %.
The research literature highlights a number of factors that may drive changes in diversity
over time. First,migration both across andwithin countrieswill alter the demographic balance
at the national and subnational levels.We thinkmigrationwas a large factor inMindanao as the
region was embroiled in war during the month that the 2000 census was conducted causing
widespread internal displacement. Second, individuals, for a number of reasons, may shift
their identification or affiliations over time. This may be due to slow-moving structural forces
such as modernization and secularization or to more intentional actions such as religious
conversion or assimilationist desires. Third, the reclassification and redefinition of groups, for
instance through the census bureau, may also play a role (Nobles 2000). Lastly, differential
birth or death rates across groups may further influence their relative sizes over time, although
the effect in just a decade is probably small relative to other factors.
Regardless of its causes, the variation over time documented here underscores problems
with the use of some of the most commonly-used data on ethno-religious diversity. The
data used in Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), for instance, is over 50 years old, while the data
used in Alesina et al. (2003b) is about 20 years old on average, and we detect significant
changes in just a decade. The lack of up-to-date data on ethnicity and religion poses a
major challenge for research. Given the extent to which ethno-religious landscapes change
over time, we should be much more careful about drawing conclusions with out-of-date
data. We should be especially concerned about temporal variation in conflict-affected
societies given the likelihood of displacement, as well as in analysis of areas where
economic migration is high, such as cities in developing countries.
5.4 Sensitivity to Space
The data presented above unambiguously illustrate that divisions manifest differently
across different administrative levels in Mindanao. We should not expect national-level
cleavages to be reflected, even on average, at the local level. Moreover, there is a clear
empirical pattern in Mindanao: as the level of aggregation declines, measures either rise or
fall but generally do so monotonically. Simple proportions, the intermarriage index, and
cross-cuttingness each tend to increase as the spatial unit gets smaller; whereas fraction-
alization, cultural (distance) fractionalization, polarization, segregation, and horizontal
inequality each tend to decrease. Although measures move in opposing directions the story
they collectively tell for Mindanao is generally consistent: divisions appear deeper when
measured at higher levels of aggregation. Our impression of the extent of a society’s
divisions then may be highly sensitive to the spatial level at which we measure them.
In order to compare the relative sensitivity of each measure to the selection of the spatial
unit, we use the following simple formula:
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Spatial sensitivity ¼ xlevel A  xlevel Bj j
xlevel A
where x is the average of the measure of interest and level A and level B refer to the two
administrative levels being compared. Table 7 provides illustrative data for the Mindanao-
to-municipality and region-to-province comparisons for 2000. As it suggests, there is
spatial sensitivity in all of our measures, but comparatively less for segregation (index of
dissimilarity), simple proportions, and horizontal inequality (GCOV). The intermarriage
index is most sensitive to the selection of the level of analysis.
Table 6 Percentage changes in
diversity measures between 2000
and 2010 for Mindanao at the
municipality level
Intermarriage index (Moro–Settler) 67.24
Intermarriage index (Muslim–Christian) 51.02
Fractionalization (ethnicity) 15.35
Cultural fractionalization (ethnicity) 13.12
Simple proportion (Moro) 9.97
Polarization (ethnicity) 8.16
Simple proportion (Muslim) 7.54
Horizontal inequality GCOV (ethnicity) 6.92
Polarization (religion) 4.52
Cultural fractionalization (religion) 4.46
Fractionalization (religion) 4.46
Segregation index of dissimilarity (Moro–Lumad/Settler) 2.55
Segregation index of dissimilarity (Muslim–Christian/Other) 1.47
Crosscuttingness (ethnicity and religion) 1.18
Horizontal inequality GCOV (religion) 0.05
Table 7 Percentage changes in diversity measures between different areal units (2000)
Between Mindanao
and the average
municipality
Between the average
region and the average
province
Intermarriage index (Moro–Settler) 1352.98 27.02
Intermarriage index (Muslim–Christian) 1350.90 30.31
Crosscuttingness (ethnicity and religion) 85.13 9.69
Fractionalization (religion) 63.59 14.69
Cultural fractionalization (religion) 63.59 14.69
Polarization (religion) 62.53 13.63
Fractionalization (ethnicity) 56.68 13.28
Cultural fractionalization (ethnicity) 55.79 12.39
Polarization (ethnicity) 50.42 11.55
Simple proportions (Moro) 43.53 0.32
Simple proportions (Muslim) 42.34 0.27
Horizontal inequality GCOV (ethnicity) 33.29 7.33
Horizontal inequality GCOV (religion) 31.10 4.24
Segregation index of dissimilarity (Moro–Lumad/Settler) 26.56 2.77
Segregation index of dissimilarity (Muslim–Christian/other) 25.56 2.15
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The spatial variation observed here highlights several issues for researchers. First,
researchers interested in the effects of ethnic divisions should take note of the modifiable
areal unit problem (MAUP) (Openshaw 1983). The MAUP, a well-known issue among
geographers, describes ‘‘the sensitivity of analytical results to the definition of [spatial]
units for which data are collected’’ (Fotheringham and Wong 1991). It comprises two inter-
related effects: a scaling effect, illustrated here, where the number (i.e., size) of units
matters for inferences, and a zoning effect, where the boundaries (or shape) of the units
matter. The MAUP then underlines the importance of selecting the appropriate unit of
analysis using theory rather than the availability of data. We need to pay careful attention
to the theoretical mechanism linking divisions to the outcome we are interested in
explaining. The areal unit should be selected at the same level that theory posits the
mechanism produces its effect. Generally, we would expect theory to suggest an areal unit
that has political, social, or economic significance such as those defined by electoral or
administrative boundaries.
Researchers then should rely on theory to describe the causal pathway and predict the level
at which the outcome of interest will be observed. Take one well-known example. A com-
monly-posited theoretical mechanism for why ethnic diversity undermines public good
provision is that non-coethnics have conflicting preferences that they express through voting
(Alesina et al. 1999). Consequently, we would expect to see an effect at the level at which
elected officials have discretion over the public good in question. For instance, if school
budgets are decided at the state level, not the municipal level, we should then see a rela-
tionship between measures of ethnic division and school budgets at the state level, but not
necessarily themunicipal level. It is worth noting a secondary implication of this voting logic:
electoral institutions will likelymediate the effects of conflicting ethnic preferences. It would
be circumspect then for researchers to control for electoral institutional design as proportional
representation systems may produce different effects to majoritarian systems.
Second, especially because so much research on the impact of ethnic divisions takes
place at the cross-national level, analysts should beware the ecological fallacy. We should
not assume that inferences drawn at the macro-level hold at the micro-level. For instance,
countries that appear highly-conflicted by ethno-religious differences at the national level
may either be harmonious or have different drivers of conflict at sub-national levels. In the
context of our case, although ethno-religious divisions appear deeply-inscribed at the
Mindanao-level, they may not explain conflict observed at the municipal-level, for
instance. Indeed, finer-grained research suggests that other factors, notably clan rivalries,
may be at work (Torres 2014). Similarly, research on the under-provision of public goods
generally finds a negative correlation with ethnic diversity using national level data. Yet,
recent work by Gerring et al. (2015) shows ethnic divisions may in fact be positively
correlated with public goods provision at the subnational level.
Finally, the differences between subnational levels in measures of ethnic divisions
observed here suggest researchers should also pay attention to the spatial organization of
ethnic groups within society. Countries with the same ethnic divisions scores at the
national level may nonetheless experience different political, social, and economic out-
comes depending on the subnational configuration of ethnic groups in each. A small but
growing number of researchers are finding settlement patterns within the unit of analysis
matter for outcomes such as quality of government (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011), trust
(Robinson 2015), and civil conflict (Matuszeski and Schneider 2006). In Mindanao, we
find the island group does not appear so deeply-divided when we look at average scores of
ethnic divisions at the barangay level. Yet if we considered the spatial organization of these
barangays within Mindanao we would quickly realize the island is spatially segregated
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along ethnic and religious lines and may conversely conclude it is deeply-divided. Table 8
gives a simple example of two countries with three ethnic groups, each comprising equal
shares of the national population. The two countries have the same national fractional-
ization scores. Yet in Country A, the same diversity shown at the national level is mirrored
at the sub-national (state) level, whereas in Country B, each state is completely ethnically
homogenous. Which country is more divided and prone to conflict?
The answer is not straightforward as the theoretical literature offers conflicting pre-
dictions. Some theorists argue territorial homogeneity is key to mediating ethno-national
conflicts and advocate ethnic decentralization and federalism (Lijphart 1977). Conversely,
others suggest such homogeneity (implying ethnic homelands) may heighten the risk of
ethnic separatist conflicts (Toft 2001) or that heterogeneity is preferable as contact between
ethnic groups will reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations (Hewstone and Swart
2011). Notwithstanding the divergent predictions, these theories nonetheless all underscore
the point that researchers should not ignore the potentially significant effect of ethnic
settlement patterns in their analyses.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The hypothesis that ethno-religious divisions contribute to negative outcomes and poor
quality of life in a variety of economic, political, and social domains has motivated an
ever-expanding corpus of research. Yet this proposition is far from simple to test. We have
sought to illustrate the complexity of conceptualizing and measuring divisions in ethnically
and religiously diverse societies. Different bodies of research emphasize conceptually
distinct aspects of divisions: from social structure to social distance to spatial distance
between groups in society. Disaggregating the notion of division then is an important first
step towards bringing conceptual coherence across disparate theoretical literatures. If
ethnic divisions do indeed have negative impacts, disaggregation also has policy impor-
tance: if conflict results from cultural distance, for instance, review language policy; if it is
spatial distance, consider housing policy. Yet the challenge is not only better conceptu-
alization; it is also better theorization. Theories should clearly specify the causal pathway,
that is the mechanism, through which ethnic divisions lead to particular outcomes. It is not
theoretically sufficient, for instance, to state that conflicting preferences, weak cross-group
ties, or cultural barriers cause undesirable outcomes without also specifying how precisely
these factors are expected to do so.
Measurement should, logically, follow conceptualization and theorization. Data avail-
ability and calculation convenience should not mean either positing mechanisms to fit
measures or disregarding the latter’s assumptions and limitations. We have highlighted the
sensitivity of measures to the categorization methodology, the passage of time, and spatial
variation. The latter two sensitivities suggest the dynamic character of divisions and we
make two simple suggestions for better incorporating temporal and spatial dynamics in
Table 8 Example of spatial
variation in fractionalization
between two countries each with
three groups of equal size and
each comprising three subna-
tional units (states)
Country A Country B
National-level fractionalization 0.67 0.67
Fractionalization in state a 0.67 0
Fractionalization in state b 0.67 0
Fractionalization in state c 0.67 0
The Measurement of Ethnic and Religious Divisions: Spatial…
123
future research. For time, assuming longitudinal data exist, the change or rate of change in
individual measures might be considered directly in analyses as either a causal factor or as
an outcome. For space, researchers may wish to include one or more of the segregation
measures in the analysis, in addition to their other measures of divisions, to capture or
control for the variety of ethnic settlement patterns that may exist within society.
The stakes of getting concept and measure right are considerable. Policy-makers in
diverse societies face a fundamental choice between preserving and eliminating ethnic
differences, and the ‘‘diversity detriment’’ hypothesis risks misguiding a panoply of public
policies if divisions are inappropriately conceptualized and measured (Gerring et al. 2015).
At stake, for instance, are policies of institutional governance, nation-building and
immigration, and electoral design: preservationists would advocate for federalism, multi-
culturalism, or proportional representation; eliminationists may alternatively campaign for
partition, assimilation, or majoritarian voting (McGarry and O’Leary 1994). Finally, we
also urge a rebalancing of the research agenda to consider the validity of a ‘‘diversity
dividend’’ hypothesis (Gisselquist et al. 2015). ‘‘New’’ diversity, in the form of immi-
gration, for instance, has been shown to be beneficial to the rejuvenation of the economies
of advanced industrialized nations. Consistent and appropriate conceptualization and
measurement of divisions across societal objectives then will be an imperative if policy-
makers are to be able to fairly assess the merits and demerits of diversity.
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